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	 This	 paper	 analyzes	 the	 role	 of	 sovereign	 governance	 and	 stock	 exchange	 rules	 in	


















that	 recent	 regulatory	 changes,	 such	 as	MIFID,	 have	 influenced	 the	 location	 of	 trade	 for	 non‐US	
stocks	that	cross‐list	in	the	US.		
	
Sovereign	governance	and/or	regulation	should	 influence	the	 location	of	 trade	for	non‐US	
stocks	 that	 cross‐list	 in	 the	 US.	 The	 amount	 of	 non‐US	 volume	 should	 increase	with	 the	 non‐US	
country’s	regulatory	strength.	This	 is	because	stronger	regulatory	 institutions	 imply	stronger	 law	








Trading	 rules	 should	 affect	 the	 extent	 of	 trading	 for	 cross‐listed	 stocks.	 Trading	 rules	
include	 restrictions	 on	 insider	 trading,	 market	 manipulation,	 and	 front	 running.2	The	 policy	
underlying	trading	rules	is	that	they	increase	the	integrity	of	market	prices,	which	gives	investors	
confidence	 to	 rely	 on	 market	 prices	 and	 encourages	 trade.3	Thus,	 prior	 studies	 show	 a	 clear	
relationship	 between	 rules	 and	 trading	 behavior.4	However,	 compliance	 can	 be	 costly,	 and	
excessively	stringent	rules	might	deter	some	brokers	from	operating	in	some	markets	(especially	in	





examining	 the	 implementation	of	MIFID	as	 a	natural	 experiment.	Our	 sample	 comprises	non‐U.S.	
firms	 listed	 on	 a	 U.S.	 exchange	 between	 1996	 and	 2008.	 Our	 governance	 proxies	 are	 the	World	
Bank	 governance	 indices,	 the	 ICRG	 composite	 index,	 the	 S&P	 sovereign	 risk	 ratings,	 and	 the	
Spamann	(2010)	index.	Our	exchange	rules	variables	derive	from	Cumming	et	al.	(Cumming	et	al.,	







of	exchange	rules	 increases	with	the	strength	of	regulatory	 institutions.	Further,	 trade	appears	to	
have	shifted	out	of	Europe	 following	 the	 implementation	of	MIFID	 in	November	2008,	 consistent	
with	 the	 prediction	 that	MIFID	 has	 not	 been	wholly	 effective	 in	 promoting	 trade	 in	 Europe.	 Our	
																																																																		







2007).	 Further,	 stronger	 securities	 laws	 reduce	 a	 firm's	 cost	 of	 capital	 (Lambert	 et	 al.,	 2007;	 Daske	 et	 al.,	
2008;	Hail	and	Leuz,	2009).	This	has	induced	calls	for	tougher	securities	regulations	(e.g.	Merrick	et	al.,	2005),	





results	 are	 also	 robust	 to	 controlling	 for	 firm‐specific,	 and	 country‐specific	 factors,	 and	 for	
controlling	 for	 factors	 such	 as	 the	 information	 share	 of	 the	 US‐market	 relative	 to	 the	 non‐US	
market.		
	
Our	 main	 contributions	 are	 four‐fold.	 First,	 we	 highlight	 the	 importance	 of	 sovereign	
governance	as	a	determinant	of	 the	 location	of	 trade.	Second,	we	show	that	stock	exchange	rules	
influence	the	location	of	trade,	although	excessively	stringent	laws	can	deter	trade.	Third,	we	show	
the	joint	importance	of	rules	and	regulatory	institutions.	Fourth,	we	highlight	the	impact	of	MIFID	
and	 provide	 insights	 into	 its	 effectiveness.	 These	 results	 are	 important	 to	 exchanges,	 regulators,	
and	 governments	 that	might	want	 to	 increase	 the	 amount	 of	 volume	 in	 the	 home	market.	 They	




is	 related	 to	 prior	 work	 showing	 the	 importance	 of	 regulation	 to	 economic	 development	 (for	
example	La	Porta	et	al.,	1997,	1998).	Second,	 the	paper	 is	related	to	other	 literature	showing	the	
importance	of	stock	exchange	rules	for	market	integrity	(Cumming	and	Johan,	2008)	and	liquidity	




might	be	greatest	 if	 governance	 in	 the	home	market	 is	 the	weakest.7	Fourth,	Halling	et	 al.	 (2008)	
analyze	 the	 location	 of	 trade	 for	 stocks	 that	 cross‐list	 in	 the	 U.S.	 They	 find	 that	 some	 firm	 level	
characteristics	determine	the	location	of	trade	for	stocks	from	developed	markets	but	not	for	stocks	
from	emerging	markets.	The	results	suggest	that	a	further	analysis	of	the	impact	of	exchange	rules	


















In	 this	 section	 we	 develop	 three	 main	 hypotheses	 that	 are	 tested	 in	 the	 paper.	 The	 first	
hypothesis	 relates	 to	 country‐level	 governance	 and	 risk.	 The	 second	 hypothesis	 relates	 to	 stock	
exchange	 rules.	 The	 third	 hypothesis	 examines	MIFID	 in	 order	 to	 highlight	 the	 use	 of	 a	 natural	











Some	 literature	 indicates	 that	 country‐level	 governance	 should	 improve	 market	
development.	 La	 Porta,	 Lopez‐de‐Silanes	 and	 Shleifer	 (1997,	 2008)	 show	 that	 stock	 market	





they	 list	 in	 the	 US	 (Reese	 and	Weisbach,	 2002;	 Doidge	 et	 al.,	 2004;	 Hail	 and	 Leuz,	 2009).	 This	
implies	 that	 weak	 governance	 environments	 are	 unattractive	 to	 investors;	 and	 thus,	 that	 weak	
																																																																		












There	 should	 be	 a	 quadratic	 relationship	 between	 (a)	 stock	 exchange	 rules	 and	 (b)	 the	
proportion	 of	 trade	 in	 the	 U.S.	market.	We	 focus	 on	 ‘investor	 protection’	 type	 rules	 rather	 than	





stock	exchange.	They	 find	 that	 stronger	 rules	 improve	 the	 liquidity	of	 individual	 stocks.	Hail	 and	
Luez	 (2006)	 show	 that	 strong	 exchange	 rules	 reduce	 a	 firm’s	 cost	 of	 capital.	 La	 Porta,	 Lopez‐de‐
Silanes,	 and	 Shleifer	 (2006)	 show	 that	 disclosure	 rules	 backed	 by	 the	 threat	 of	 liability	 through	
private	enforcement	improve	stock	market	development.	Supporting	this,	Cumming,	Johan,	and	Li	
(2011)	 show	 that	 an	 exchange’s	 liquidity	 increases	 with	 the	 strength	 of	 its	 trading	 rules.	 These	
studies	 do	 not	 examine	 the	 location	 of	 trade;	 however,	 they	 do	 imply	 that	 strong	 rules	 should	
increase	the	amount	of	trade	in	the	Non‐U.S.	market.		
	
The	 relationship	 between	 Non‐U.S.‐Trade/US‐Trade	 should	 be	 quadratic.	 There	 is	 some	
tangential	 literature	on	point.	Burkart,	Gromb,	and	Panunzi	(1997)	and	Boot,	Gopalan	and	Thakor	
(2006)	 show	 that	 the	 costs	 associated	 with	 high	 levels	 of	 disclosure	 and	 governance	 may	 deter	
managers	from	pursuing	profitable	investment	opportunities.	Bruno	and	Claessens	(2010)	indicate	
that	 strong	 governance	 companies	 in	 legally	 stringent	 countries	 trade	 at	 a	 discount	 to	 strong	
governance	companies	in	legally	 ‘flexible’	countries.	These	studies	show	that	requiring	 ‘too	much’	
compliance	 can	 reduce	 firm	 values.	 By	 parity	 of	 reasoning,	 requiring	 too	 much	 compliance	 and	










The	 intuitive	 rationale	 is	 that	 if	 regulatory	 institutions	 are	 weak,	 then	 there	 is	 inadequate	
enforcement	 of	 securities	 laws.	 Bhattacharya	 and	Daouk	 (2009)	 support	 this,	 concluding	 that	 no	
law	 can	 be	 superior	 to	 a	 good	 law	 that	 is	 not	 enforced.	 For	 example,	 Humphery‐Jenner	 (2011)	
argues	 that	 securities	 malfeasance	 is	 prolific	 in	 China	 because	 securities	 laws	 are	 not	 enforced	
rather	 than	 because	 the	 law	 is	 bad.	 Subsequently,	 we	 expect	 the	 ratio	 of	 non‐US	 volume	 to	 US	
volume	 to	 increase	 with	 the	 interaction	 of	 ‘Rules’	 and	 ‘Regulation’.	 The	 following	 hypothesis	
captures	this.		
	






the	 U.S.	 exchange.	 The	 European	 Union	 (EU)	 promulgated	 the	 Directive	 on	Markets	 in	 Financial	
Instruments	(MIFID)	in	May	2005.	The	implementation	deadline	was	November	2007.	MIFID	is	one	






manipulation,	 volume	 manipulation,	 spoofing,	 false	 disclosure,	 and	 broker‐agency	 conflicts	
(Cumming	 et	 al.,	 2011).	 Second,	 it	 attempts	 to	 strengthen	 pre‐trade	 and	 post‐trade	 disclosure	
















First,	 the	 increase	 in	 disclosure	might	 discourage	 brokerage	 firms	 from	 advising	 clients	 to	








flexible	 and	 adaptive	 to	 contemporary	 circumstances	 (Graham,	 2002;	 Humphery‐Jenner,	 2009).	
However,	 uncertainty	 can	 impose	 transaction	 costs	 by	 creating	 legal	 uncertainty	 (Wagner,	 2005,	








9	A	 ‘reasonableness’	standard	 is	common	in	 law.	However,	 its	definition	depends	on	the	context	 in	which	 it	
appears.	 Given	 that	 MIFID	 is	 unique	 in	 its	 cross‐border	 regulation	 of	 financial	 markets,	 there	 is	 no	
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NMS	 in	 the	US.	 	Under	Reg	NMS	price	 alone	matters	 for	best	 execution	duty,	while	under	MIFID	
investment	 firms	must	 comply	with	 best	 execution	 duty	 by	 looking	 at	 a	wide	 array	 of	 execution	
characteristics	such	as	speed,	and	likelihood	of	execution	and	settlement.		Reg	NMS	and	MIFID	also	
differ	 in	 terms	of	 the	 trading	data	disclosure	of	 trades’	 execution	 information.	Reg	NMS	 requires	
both	 markets	 and	 intermediaries	 to	 regularly	 disclose	 standardized	 information	 about	 the	
execution	quality,	and	trading	information	is	consolidated	and	available	on	a	free	market	(Petrella,	
2010).	 By	 contrast.	 MIFID	 does	 not	 require	 markets	 and	 intermediaries	 to	 consolidate	 trading	
information	 or	 trading	 venues,	 or	 to	 disclose	 execution	 quality	 (although	 MIFID	 still	 enables	
businesses	 to	 offer	 services	 that	 aggregate	 data	 from	 different	 trading	 venues).	 Petrella	 (2010)	






















Our	 sample	 comprises	 non‐U.S.	 firms	 listed	 on	 a	 U.S.	 exchange	 between	 1996	 and	 2008.	
There	are	458	unique	firms	for	a	total	of	3128	firm‐year	observations.	The	return	and	volume	data	
comes	from	CRSP	(for	US	data)	and	Compustat	Global	(for	non‐US	data).	Firm‐level	accounting	data	
comes	 from	 Compustat.	 Data	 on	 country‐governance	 comes	 from	 the	 World	 Bank	 governance	
indicators,	 International	 Country	 Risk	 Guide’s	 (ICRG)	 composite	 risk	 ratings,	 Standard	 &	 Poors	
sovereign	risk	ratings,	and	Spamann’s	(2010)	revised	Antidirector	Rights	Index	(ADRI).	The	World	





The	 variables	 come	 in	 four	 main	 categories:	 (1)	 dependent	 variables	 for	 volume,	 (2)	


















The	dependent	variable	 is	a	measure	of	 the	ratio	of	non‐U.S.	 trading	volume	to	U.S.‐trading	





by	 the	exchange	rate	 for	day	ݐ	by	 the	number	of	shares	 traded	 in	 the	non‐U.S.	market	on	day	ݐ	to	












the	 strength	 of	 the	 non‐U.S.	 market’s	 exchange	 rules.	 The	 exchange	 rule	 variables	 come	 from	
Cumming	et	al.	 (2011).	They	analyze	the	rules	of	stock	exchanges	across	seven	dimensions:	price	
manipulation,	 volume	 manipulation,	 spoofing,	 false	 disclosure,	 market	 manipulation,	 insider	
trading,	and	broker‐agent	conflict	rules.	For	each	dimension,	they	assign	a	score	representing	the	
strength	of	the	exchange’s	investor	protection.	 	We	use	(a)	the	score	reported	in	Cumming,	Johan,	








an	 indicator,	 I(MIFID),	 that	 equals	one	 if	 the	 exchange	 comes	under	 	MIFID.	We	also	 analyze	 the	





ICRG	risk	scores:	 The	 ICRG	 reports	 scores	 for	 various	 types	 of	 sovereign	 risk.	 The	 ICRG	 scores	
have	 seen	 some	use	 in	 the	 literature	 (Erb	 et	 al.,	 1996;	Gradstein,	 2007;	Boubakri	 et	 al.,	 2008).	A	






World	 Bank	 regulation	 and	 governance	 scores:	 The	 World	 Bank	 ranks	 countries	 on	 six	
dimensions	of	governance.	The	World	Bank	measures	and	ranks	the	government's	accountability,	


























be	 ‘familiar’	 in	nature	to	U.S.	 firms,	and	familiarity	can	 increase	returns	(following	Sarkissian	and	





Debt/Assets:	 Financial	 leverage	 (proxied	 by	 the	 ratio	 of	 long	 term	 debt	 to	 assets)	 most	 likely	
reduces	 the	 portion	 of	 trade	 that	 occurs	 in	 the	 U.S.	 market.	 There	 are	 two	 key	 reasons.	 First,	
moderately	high	levels	of	leverage	suggest	that	the	firm	has	access	to	capital	in	the	home	market,	
which	 implies	 that	 the	 home	 market	 is	 relatively	 sophisticated	 and	 liquid.	 The	 implied	
attractiveness	of	the	home	market	might	encourage	more	trade	in	the	home	market.	Second,	while	
high	leverage	can	help	to	ameliorate	Jensen	(1986)	type	agency	costs	of	free	cash	flows,	it	can	also	





Cash/Assets:	Non‐U.S.	 firms	with	higher	cash	holdings	should	be	 less	risky	and	should	be	 larger.	
Thus,	in	a	similar	way	to	assets	(and	a	converse	way	to	Debt/Assets),	higher	cash	holdings	should	




likely	 to	 attract	 interest	 from	U.S.	 investors.	 This	 is	 because	 of	 the	 compounding	 of	 information	
15	
	
asymmetry	 due	 to	 (a)	 firm‐level	 factors	 and	 (b)	 the	 firm	 being	 domiciled	 in	 another	 country.	




therewith	 (Desyllas	 and	 Hughes,	 2010).	 Therefore,	 the	 models	 include	 R&D/Sales,	





more	 on	 advertising	 tend	 to	 have	 more	 investors,	 a	 more	 dispersed	 investor	 base,	 and	 higher	




FCF/Assets:	 High	 free	 cash	 flows	 can	 induce	 Jensen	 (1986)	 type	 costs	 of	 free	 cash	 flow.	 Poor	
corporate	governance	can	influence	institutional	investors’	 investment	decisions	(McCahery	et	al.,	
2010).	 Thus,	 high	 free	 cash	 flows	might	 deter	 institutional	 investment	 in	 the	 stock,	which	might	









FDI:	Home	market	development	should	 increase	with	 the	 level	of	FDI‐to‐GDP	(Borensztein	et	al.,	
1998).	Thus,	the	models	include	the	ratio	FDI/GDP,	sourced	from	the	World	Bank.		
	




Turnover	and	market	activity:	 The	 average	 turnover	 in	 the	 home	market	 should	 influence	 the	





non‐U.S.	 market	 (following	 Hamada,	 1966;	 Janeba,	 1995).	 This	 might	 shift	 volume	 to	 the	 U.S.	
market.	The	models	control	for	the	highest	level	of	corporate	tax	in	the	non‐U.S.	market.	The	data	is	



















Further,	 language	 differences	might	make	 it	more	 difficult	 to	 process	 information,	 especially	 for	
companies	 that	 trade	 in	 emerging	 markets,	 where	 rules	 and	 regulations	 might	 not	 always	 be	



























	 lnሺ$Volume	Ratio൅1ሻ ൌ 	݂ሺRegulation,	Controlsሻ (1)
	 lnሺ$Volume	Ratio൅1ሻ ൌ ݂൫Rules, Rules2, Controls൯		 (2)
 lnሺ$Volume	Ratio൅1ሻ ൌ ݂ሺRules, Rules	ൈ	Regulation, Controlsሻ (3)
 lnሺ$Volume	Ratio൅1ሻ ൌ ݂ሺܫሺMIFIDሻ, ܫሺDateሻ, ܫሺMIFIDሻ ൈ ܫሺDateሻ,	Controlsሻ		 (4)
	
Here,	 ‘Rules’	 denotes	 	 variously	 one	 of	 the	 exchange	 rules	 variables	 pertaining	 to	 volume	
manipulation,	 price	 manipulation,	 broker‐agent	 conflicts,	 spoofing,	 false	 disclosure,	 or	 insider	
trading.	‘Regulation’	denotes	one	of	the	measures	of	regulation	(the	WB	governance	index,	the	ICRG	
composite	 index,	 the	Spamann	(2010)	ADRI,	or	 the	S&P	sovereign	risk	rating).	 ‘Controls’	denotes	
the	 control	 variables.	 For	 the	 difference	 in	 difference	 model	 in	 Equation	 (4),	ܫሺMIFIDሻ	is	 an	
indicator	 that	equals	one	 if	 the	non‐U.S.	exchange	 is	subject	 to	MIFID.	ܫሺDateሻ	is	an	 indicator	 that	



















with	 sovereign	 governance,	 (b)	 has	 a	 quadratic	 relationship	 with	 stock	 exchange	 rules,	 and	 (c)	
















The	 univariate	 results	 show	 a	 relation	 between	 governance,	 exchange‐rules	 and	 the	
proportion	 of	 volume	 that	 trades	 in	 the	 non‐U.S.	 market.	 Table	 4	 contains	 volume‐ratio	 and	
governance	variables	by	country.	The	statistics	indicate	that	the	proportion	of	volume	traded	in	the	
home‐market	is	higher	if	the	various	governance	dimensions	are	higher.	Table	5	contains	pairwise	
correlations	between	 the	governance	variables	and	 the	proportion	of	volume	traded	 in	 the	home	
market.	 The	 pairwise	 correlations	 suggest	 that	 (a)	 the	 ratio	 of	 non‐U.S.	 volume	 to	 U.S.	 volume	








regulation,	 governance,	 and	 political	 stability	 monotically	 increases	 with	 volume	 in	 the	 non‐U.S.	











of	 home‐country	 governance	 and	 the	 ratio	 of	 non‐U.S.	 to	 U.S.	 volume.	 Table	 6	 contains	 the	
regression	 results.	There	are	 two	key	 results.	First,	 the	 ratio	of	non‐U.S.	 to	U.S.	 volume	 increases	
with	home‐country	governance.	Columns	1‐4	examine	a	 linear	 relationship.	The	coefficient	on	all	
governance	variables	is	positive	and	statistically	significant,	while	the	antidirector	rights	index	(as	




the	relationship	between	governance	and	 the	volume‐ratio	 is	not	quadratic.	Columns	5‐8	 include	














exchange‐rules	 somewhat	 deter	 investors	 from	 the	 non‐U.S.	 market.	 Regarding	 economic	
significance,	however,	the	positive	effect	of	more	rules	is	large:	a	1‐standard	deviation	increase	in	
the	Rules	Index	variable	gives	rise	to	a	273%	increase	in	the	ratio	of	non‐US	volume	to	US‐Volume,	
and	this	effect	 is	117%	for	 the	Price	 Index,	62%	for	 the	False	Disclosure	 Index	and	296%	for	 the	
Market	Manipulation	Index.		Note	that	while	these	results	hold	for	many	of	the	exchange‐rule	sub‐
indexes,	the	linear	‘Broker’	term	is	negative	and	significant	whereas	the	quadratic	‘Broker’	term	is	
positive	 and	 significant.	 An	 explanation	 could	 be	 that	 stringent	 broker‐agent	 rules	 initially	 deter	
brokers	 from	 advising	 clients	 to	 invest	 in	 the	 non‐U.S.	 market,	 and	 broker‐agent	 rules	 are	 only	
beneficial	after	passing	the	initial	deterrence	threshold.		
	
Table	 8	 contains	 models	 that	 control	 for	 both	 stock‐exchange	 rules	 and	 sovereign	
governance.	 The	 first	 four	 columns	 contain	 Tobit	 results	 and	 the	 last	 four	 columns	 contain	 OLS	
results.	The	key	finding	is	that	the	coefficients	on	the	governance	variable	and	the	first‐order	rules	
variable	are	positive	and	statistically	 significant,	whereas	 the	quadratic	 rules	variable	 is	negative	









this	prediction	 for	all	measures	of	 regulation	except	 the	Spamann	(2010)	ADRI.	This	 is	 a	 curious	
																																																																		













the	 data.	 Figure	 1	 contains	 the	 ratio	 of	 non‐U.S.	 volume	 to	 U.S.	 volume	 for	 countries	 that	 were	

























the	 U.S.	 market.	 This	 finding	 implies	 that	 cash	 holdings	 connote	 financial	 stability	 and	 help	 to	
ameliorate	the	information	asymmetry	associated	with	non‐U.S.	companies.	(4)	The	proportion	of	
trade	 that	 locates	 in	 the	 U.S.	 decreases	with	 R&D/Sales	 and	 Intangibles/Assets,	 and	 is	 lower	 for	
high‐tech	firms.	(5)	The	presence	of	institutional	shareholders	in	the	US	shifts	trade	away	from	the	
non‐US	exchange.	This	quadrates	with	the	 idea	that	 institutional	shareholders	account	 for	a	 large	
portion	of	 trade;	 and	 thus,	 increase	 the	 relative	 amount	of	 trade	 in	 the	US,	 and	 that	 the	 liquidity	
























control	 for	 the	Asian	 financial	 crisis,	 robustness	 tests	exclude	observations	 from	before	1999.	To	









there	 is	 a	 tax	 treaty	 between	 the	US	 and	 the	 country	 of	 the	 non‐US	 exchange.15	We	 find	 that	 the	









in	 addition	 to,	 or	 instead	 of,	 the	 exchange	 dummies	 We	 find	 that	 if	 we	 remove	 the	 exchange	
dummies,	then	emerging	markets	have	a	significantly	higher	ratio	of	non‐US	volume	to	US‐volume	
than	do	other	markets	(specifically,	the	coefficient	on	I(DJ	Emerging)	is	positive	and	significant	at	




the	 company’s	 ordinary	 shares	 that	 are	 equivalent	 to	 one	 American	 Depositary	 Receipt.	 This	
variable	does	not	significantly	influence	the	ratio	of	non‐US	volume	to	US	volume.		
	
Ninth,	 the	 results	 are	 robust	 to	 excluding	 periods	 in	 which	 there	 are	 short	 selling	
restrictions.	Chen	et	al	(2008)	indicate	that	the	availability	of	short	selling	can	influence	the	rate	of	
convergence	 between	ADRs	 and	 home‐market	 stock.	 Further,	 one	 possibility	 is	 that	much	 of	 the	
volume	in	non‐US	stocks	listed	in	the	US	comes	from	short	selling	(in	an	attempt	to	take	advantage	
of	mispricing	between	US	issues	and	non‐US	issues).	We	note	that	at	some	point,	the	trader	must	
unwind	 the	 short	position;	however,	 this	 can	account	 for	 some	 short	 term	differences	 in	 volume	
ratios.	Subsequently,	we	control	for	this	by	excluding	the	crisis	years	of	2007	and	2008	within	our	




16	The	Dow	 Jones	 list	 of	 35	 emerging	markets	 comprises:	Argentina,	Bahrain,	Brazil,	 Bulgaria,	 Chile,	 China,	
Colombia,	 Czech	 Republic,	 Egypt,	 Estonia,	 Hungary,	 India,	 Indonesia,	 Jordan,	 Kuwait,	 Latvia,	 Lithuania,	




Tenth,	 the	 results	 are	 robust	 to	 controlling	 for	 the	 degree	 of	 exchange	 rate	 liberalization	
and/or	the	degree	of	foreign	ownership	allowed.	We	obtain	the	data	from	MSCI	(2011).	We	create	





governance	 variables	 and	 the	 stock‐exchange	 rules	 variables	 are	 qualitatively	 the	 same	 as	 the	
results	reported.		
	
Eleventh,	 the	 results	 are	 robust	 to	 controlling	 for	 measures	 of	 transactions	 costs	 either	
instead	 of,	 or	 in	 addition	 to,	 stock	 exchange	 dummies.	 Gagnon	 and	 Karolyi	 (2010)	 find	 that	
transactions/holding	costs	 can	 influence	deviations	 from	price‐parity	 for	 cross‐listed	stocks.	This	
implies	 that	holding	costs/transactions	costs	could	also	 influence	 the	ratio	of	non‐US	 trade	 to	US	
trade.	Specifically,	of	trading	costs	are	higher	in	the	non‐US	exchange,	then	there	is	likely	to	be	less	
volume	 in	 that	exchange.	Stock	exchange	dummies	should	capture	much	of	 the	exchange‐specific	
differences	in	transactions	costs.	Nonetheless,	we	also	examine	the	average	high	frequency	percent	
realized	 spread,	 percent	 effective	 spread,	 and	 percent	 quoted	 spread	 (as	 reported	 in	 Fong	 et	 al.,	
2011).	 These	 are	 typically	 seen	 as	 reasonable	 daily	measures	 of	 transactions	 costs	 and	 liquidity	









the	US	market.	That	 is,	 amount	of	US	volume	depends	on	 (a)	 the	 correlation	of	 the	non‐US	stock	
with	non‐US	assets,	 and	 (b)	 the	correlation	of	 the	non‐US	stock	with	US	assets.	This	 is	 called	 the	
‘information	share’.		
	
The	 information	 share	 has	 a	 relatively	 ambiguous	 relationship	 with	 the	 ratio	 of	 non‐US	
trade	to	US	trade.	Baruch	et	al	(2007)	find	that	the	information	share	increases	the	level	of	volume	
in	 the	 US	market.	 That	 is,	 the	 higher	 the	 correlation	 between	 home	 returns	 and	US	 returns,	 the	
greater	the	amount	of	US	trade.	However,	they	do	not	examine	the	ratio	of	non‐US	trade	to	US	trade	
(focusing	 instead	 on	 US	 volumes).	 Arguably,	 the	 information	 share	 could	 actually	 reduce	 the	
amount	of	US	trade	relative	to	the	amount	of	non‐US	trade	(i.e.	increase	the	ratio	of	non‐US	trade	to	
US	trade).	The	rationale	is	that	if	there	is	a	higher	information	share,	then	the	home	assets	are	more	
correlated	with	US	assets.	 If	 they	are	more	correlated	with	US	assets,	 then	US	 investors	might	be	
more	willing	to	invest	in	the	non‐US	markets	(by	parity	of	reasoning	to	why	the	information	share	
increases	 the	 amount	of	US	 trade).	 Supporting	 this,	Gagnon	and	Karolyi	 (2009)	 find	 that	 volume	





We	 capture	 this	 in	 the	 similar	way	 to	Baruch	 et	 al	 (2007).	 For	 each	 year	we	 compute	 an	
‘information	share’	 for	 the	stock.	We	compute	 the	 information	share	by	using	daily	stock	returns	
and	do	so	as	follows.	First,	we	run	a	 ‘restricted’	model	that	assesses	the	relationship	between	the	
non‐US	returns	and	the	non‐US	market	(in	Equation	5).	Second,	we	run	an	‘unrestricted’	mode	that	




and	 lag	 terms	 in	 Equation	 5	 and	 Equation	 6	 in	 order	 to	 control	 for	 non‐synchronious	 trading	
(following	Baruch	et	al.,	2007).	
	




















ሾ1 െ ܴ௎ோଶ ሿ݊ െ ݌௎ோܹ݄݁ݎ݁:	
ܴ௎ோଶ ൌ ܴ‐squared	from	Equation	ሺ6ሻ	
ܴோଶ ൌ ܴ‐squared	from	Equation	ሺ5ሻ		݊ ൌ Number	of	observations	
݌௎ோ ൌ Number	of	parameters	in	Equation ሺ6ሻൌ6݌ோ ൌ Number	of	parameters	in	Equation	ሺ5ሻൌ3	
(5)
	













In	 this	 paper,	 we	 examine	 the	 effect	 of	 exchange	 trading	 rules	 and	 other	 governance	
regulations	on	the	location	of	trades	for	firms	that	cross‐list	in	the	U.S.		Prior	studies	have	identified	
cross‐country	variation	in	the	location	of	trades	for	non‐U.S.	firms	with	U.S.	stock‐issues	(Halling	et	
al.,	 2010).	 Other	 studies	 have	 identified	 the	 importance	 of	 country‐governance	 to	 stock	 market	
development	and	stock	exchange	liquidity,	among	other	things	(La	Porta	et	al.,	1997,	1998).		In	this	
paper	 we	 connect	 these	 strands	 of	 literature	 to	 examine	 whether	 sovereign	 governance	 and	
exchange	rules	drive	the	trading	location	for	non‐U.S.	firms	that	cross‐list	in	the	U.S.	 	Also,	we	use	










Overall,	 our	 results	 have	 implications	 for	 countries,	 firms,	 and	 exchanges.	 Countries	 can	
encourage	more	trade	if	they	improve	their	regulation	and	governance,	and	reduce	sovereign	risk.	
























from	 Compustat.	 Analysts	 data	 are	 from	 Thomson	 Reuter’s	 Institutional	 Brokers’	 Estimate	 System	 (IBES).		







Daily	$Volume	(US)	 The	daily	volume	of	shares	 traded	 in	 the U.S.	 	market	multiplied	by	
the	share	price	on	the	U.S.	market		
Yearly	$Volume	Ratio	 The	 yearly	 average	 of	 the	 ratio:	 Daily	 $Volume	 (non‐U.S.)/	 Daily	
$Volume	(US)	
















Price	Manipulation	 Sum	of	 dummy	 variables	 for	Marking	 the	Open,	Marking	 the	 Close,	
Misleading	 End	 of	 the	 Month/Quarter/Year	 Trades,	 Intraday	









Insider	Trading	Rules	Index	 Sum	 of	 dummy	 variables	 for	 Front‐running,	 Client	 Precedence,	
Trading	 Ahead	 of	 Research	 Reports,	 Separation	 of	 Research	 and	
Trading,	 Broker	 Ownership	 Limit,	 Restrictions	 on	 Affiliation,	
Restrictions	 on	 Communications,	 Investment	 Company	 Securities,	














US Institutional Holdings	 The	 percentage	 of	 US	 shares	 outstanding	 that	 institutional	
shareholders	 (under	 13f	 obligations)	 own.	We	 compute	 this	 at	 the	
beginning	 of	 the	 year.	We	 obtain	 the	 13f	 filings	 pertaining	 to	 each	




ln(Distance	from	NY	km)	 The	 natural	 log	 of	 the	distance,	 in	 kilometers,	 between	 (a)	NY,	 and	
(b)	the	primary	non‐US	exchange	on	which	the	firm	is	listed.			
Home	Market	Cap/GDP	 The	 ratio	 of	 the	 market	 capitalization	 of	 all	 firms	 from	 the	 firm’s	
home	country	divided	by	the	country’s	GDP.	Source:	World	Bank.	






abs(Time	Zone	Difference)	 The	 absolute	 value	 of	 the	 time	 zone	 difference	 between	 (a)	 New	
York,	 and	 (b)	 the	 primary	 non‐US	 exchange	 on	 which	 the	 firm	 is	
listed.	






Advertising/Sales	 The	 firm’s	advertising	 expenditure	divided	by	 its	 sales	 (Compustat:	
xad/sale).	We	recode	missing	advertising	expenditure	as	0,	following	
MWX	(2009)	
Intangibles/Assets	 The	 firm’s	 intangible	 assets	 divided	 by	 its	 total	 assets	 (Compustat:	
intan/at).	We	recode	missing	intangibles	as	0,	following	MWX	(2009)	




Information	Share	 The	 information	share	computed	 in	a	similar	way	to	 in	Baruch	et	al	
(2007).	 This	 is	 the	 F‐statistic	 derived	 from	 comparing	 a	 the	 R‐
squared	from	a	restricted	regression	(that	regresses	the	 firm’s	non‐













ܴோଶ ൌ ܴ‐squared	from	Equation	ሺ5ሻ		݊ ൌ Number	of	observations	




















Variable	 Mean Median Standard	
Deviation	
Minimum	 Maximum	
ln($Volume	Ratio	+1)	 2.596 2.336 2.206 0.000	 7.773
	 	
Governance	Variables	 	
WB	Governance	Index	 0.806 0.857 0.158 0.294	 0.994
S&P	Rating	 16.897 19.000 4.083 0.000	 20.000
ICRG	Composite	Index	 0.798 0.811 0.066 0.519	 0.923
Spamann	ADRI	 3.929 4.000 0.908 2.000	 5.000
Rules	Index	 1.446 1.429 0.742 0.000	 3.286
Price	Manipulation	 2.607 2.000 2.131 0.000	 7.000
Volume	Manipulation	 0.667 0.000 0.817 0.000	 2.000
Spoofing	 1.342 1.000 0.964 0.000	 3.000
False	Disclosure	 0.627 1.000 0.496 0.000	 2.000
Market	Manipulation	 3.139 2.000 2.044 0.000	 9.000
Insider	Trading	 1.460 2.000 0.990 0.000	 4.000
Broker	 0.277 0.000 0.637 0.000	 3.000
	 	
Control	Variables	 	
Exchange	ln($Volume	Ratio	+1)	 0.438 0.236 0.538 0.000	 2.306
ln(Assets)	 8.316 8.427 2.247 1.233	 14.517
Debt/Assets	 0.188 0.170 0.159 0.000	 1.255
Cash/Assets	 0.109 0.058 0.144 0.000	 0.976
R&D/Sales	 1.063 0.002 38.040 0.000	 2100.500
Intangibles/Assets	 0.119 0.052 0.155 ‐0.005	 0.933
Advertising/Sales	 0.010 0.000 0.054 0.000	 2.359
High	Tech	 0.266 0.000 0.442 0.000	 1.000
FCF/Assets	 0.005 0.028 0.146 ‐2.777	 0.554
Information	share		 3.353 1.804 3.844 0.155	 14.415
Trade	Imbalance	 ‐0.013 ‐0.011 0.070 ‐0.369	 0.203
FDI/GDP	 0.000 0.000 0.001 ‐0.002	 0.004
MKTCAP/GDP	 0.011 0.009 0.007 0.001	 0.056
Home	Turnover	 0.882 0.784 0.560 0.022	 3.803






















1999	 0.828	 17.241	 0.786 3.996 1.494 1.873
2000	 0.842	 17.457	 0.805 4.003 1.476 1.906
2001	 0.840	 17.341	 0.813 3.954 1.456 1.902
2002	 0.819	 17.054	 0.800 3.938 1.432 1.888
2003	 0.812	 16.954	 0.802 3.932 1.442 1.880
2004	 0.799	 16.598	 0.802 3.946 1.446 1.836
2005	 0.796	 16.813	 0.798 3.904 1.408 1.833
2006	 0.794	 16.813	 0.795 3.890 1.355 1.781
2007	 0.754	 16.094	 0.790 3.860 1.313 1.653












































Argentina	 ARG	 0.910	 0.45	 4.35	 0.68	 3	 1.43	 2.00	 0.00	 1.00	 0.00	 3.00	 3.00	 1.00	
Australia	 AUS	 3.257	 0.93	 19.58	 0.82	 4	 2.00	 3.00	 1.00	 2.00	 0.00	 6.00	 2.00	 0.00	
Austria	 AUT	 4.958	 0.93	 20.00	 0.85	 4	 0.29	 1.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 1.00	 0.00	 0.00	
Belgium	 BEL	 2.661	 0.89	 19.00	 0.84	 2	 1.51	 3.36	 0.09	 1.18	 1.09	 4.64	 0.18	 0.00	
Brazil	 BRA	 3.155	 0.52	 8.60	 0.68	 5	 0.45	 0.05	 0.00	 1.00	 0.00	 1.05	 1.05	 0.03	
Canada	 CAN	 0.010	 0.93	 20.00	 0.86	 4	 2.00	 3.00	 1.00	 2.00	 0.00	 6.00	 2.00	 0.00	
Switzerland	 CHE	 2.679	 0.97	 20.00	 0.90	 3	 1.74	 2.60	 0.83	 1.29	 0.95	 4.13	 1.73	 0.67	
Chile	 CHL	 1.939	 0.84	 14.50	 0.77	 5	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	
Spain	 ESP	 2.480	 0.83	 19.36	 0.79	 5	 1.23	 0.88	 0.05	 1.09	 0.60	 2.11	 3.46	 0.40	
Finland	 FIN	 0.013	 0.99	 19.61	 0.88	 4	 1.10	 1.23	 0.20	 1.07	 0.37	 2.50	 1.70	 0.63	
France	 FRA	 3.578	 0.85	 20.00	 0.79	 5	 1.43	 3.04	 0.05	 1.10	 0.99	 4.57	 0.22	 0.06	
United	Kingdom	 GBR	 3.577	 0.91	 20.00	 0.82	 4	 2.13	 5.39	 1.75	 2.72	 0.89	 2.10	 2.03	 0.06	
Greece	 GRC	 1.715	 0.72	 14.97	 0.74	 3	 1.60	 2.64	 0.45	 1.52	 0.71	 3.76	 1.93	 0.19	
Hong	Kong	 HKG	 2.392	 0.84	 16.31	 0.83	 4	 1.84	 2.67	 1.71	 1.06	 0.84	 6.16	 0.35	 0.12	
India	 IND	 1.640	 0.47	 9.78	 0.69	 4	 1.57	 0.00	 1.00	 1.00	 1.00	 3.00	 2.00	 3.00	
Ireland	 IRL	 1.555	 0.93	 19.68	 0.86	 4	 1.34	 3.36	 0.85	 1.90	 0.45	 1.90	 0.95	 0.00	
Israel	 ISR	 0.996	 0.67	 14.17	 0.71	 3	 1.01	 1.98	 0.04	 0.14	 0.94	 2.84	 1.10	 0.07	
Italy	 ITA	 3.903	 0.74	 17.52	 0.79	 2	 0.83	 0.51	 0.04	 1.07	 0.88	 2.10	 1.11	 0.12	
Japan	 JPN	 3.892	 0.84	 17.92	 0.84	 5	 0.74	 0.97	 0.01	 1.02	 0.02	 1.92	 1.12	 0.11	
Korea	 KOR	 2.342	 0.70	 13.76	 0.80	 4	 3.29	 4.00	 2.00	 2.00	 1.00	 9.00	 3.00	 2.00	
Mexico	 MEX	 1.895	 0.51	 11.00	 0.73	 2	 2.00	 3.02	 1.00	 1.01	 1.00	 5.97	 2.01	 0.00	
Netherlands	 NLD	 2.214	 0.96	 20.00	 0.86	 4	 1.31	 2.38	 0.20	 1.16	 0.70	 3.54	 0.88	 0.32	
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Norway	 NOR	 3.618	 0.95	 20.00	 0.91	 4	 1.48	 2.00	 0.77	 1.04	 0.14	 3.75	 2.54	 0.11	
New	Zealand	 NZL	 2.452	 0.96	 19.00	 0.79	 5	 2.00	 2.46	 0.46	 1.46	 0.54	 4.92	 2.54	 1.62	
Philippines	 PHL	 0.590	 0.40	 8.85	 0.69	 4	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	
Portugal	 PRT	 0.078	 0.85	 17.49	 0.78	 3	 0.94	 1.00	 0.14	 1.29	 0.14	 1.00	 2.14	 0.86	
Singapore	 SGP	 2.467	 0.88	 20.00	 0.89	 4	 2.57	 3.00	 1.00	 2.00	 1.00	 7.00	 2.00	 2.00	
Sweden	 SWE	 0.027	 0.97	 19.19	 0.85	 4	 1.03	 1.17	 0.10	 1.07	 0.37	 2.33	 1.50	 0.70	
Turkey	 TUR	 1.556	 0.48	 6.92	 0.61	 4	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	







	 Variable	 A B C D E F	 G H I J K L
A	 $Volume	Ratio	 	
B	 WB	Governance	Index	 0.04 	
	 	 [0.02] 	
C	 S&P	Rating	 0.04 0.92 	
	 	 [0.01] [0.00] 	
D	 ICRG	Composite	Index	 0.06 0.84 0.81 	
	 	 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 	
E	 Spamann	ADRI	 0.12 0.39 0.30 0.24 	
	 	 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 	
F	 Rules	Index	 0.02 0.11 0.20 0.16 ‐0.26 	
	 	 [0.26] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 	
G	 Price	Manipulation	 0.04 0.25 0.33 0.18 ‐0.12 0.84	
	 	 [0.03] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]	
H	 Volume	Manipulation	 0.07 0.17 0.21 0.20 ‐0.13 0.84	 0.80
	 	 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]	 [0.00]
I	 Spoofing	 0.12 0.34 0.40 0.32 0.06 0.76	 0.84 0.82
	 	 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]	 [0.00] [0.00]
J	 False	Disclosure	 ‐0.03 ‐0.01 0.15 ‐0.03 ‐0.39 0.61	 0.61 0.44 0.31
	 	 [0.10] [0.51] [0.00] [0.05] [0.00] [0.00]	 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
K	 Market	Manipulation	 ‐0.04 ‐0.09 ‐0.03 0.04 ‐0.31 0.54	 0.18 0.20 ‐0.03 0.35
40	
	
	 	 [0.02] [0.00] [0.15] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00]	 [0.00] [0.00] [0.15] [0.00]
L	 Insider	Trading	 0.01 ‐0.11 ‐0.07 ‐0.03 ‐0.22 0.52	 0.29 0.44 0.49 0.03 0.00
	 	 [0.53] [0.00] [0.00] [0.10] [0.00] [0.00]	 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.14] [0.91]
M	 Broker	 ‐0.10 ‐0.18 ‐0.21 ‐0.08 ‐0.01 0.11	 ‐0.26 ‐0.02 ‐0.07 ‐0.03 0.11 0.37
























Dependent Variable ln($Volume Ratio +1) 
Model Tobit, Year Dummies, Exchange Dummies, Firm Clustering 
Column [1] [2] [3] [4] 
WB Governance Index 2.513*    
 [0.054]    
S&P Rating  0.140***   
  [0.002]   
ICRG Composite Index   5.189**  
   [0.010]  
ADRI (Spamann)    -0.053 
    [0.795] 
Exchange ln($Volume Ratio +1) 0.12 0.118 0.115 0.137 
 [0.605] [0.614] [0.624] [0.557] 
US Institutional Holdings -3.195*** -3.126*** -3.187*** -3.255*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
ln(Assets) -0.102** -0.118*** -0.105** -0.089** 
 [0.020] [0.008] [0.017] [0.045] 
Debt/Assets 1.135*** 1.120*** 1.151*** 1.142*** 
 [0.006] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005] 
Cash/Assets -1.124** -1.309*** -1.167** -1.024** 
 [0.025] [0.009] [0.020] [0.042] 
R&D/Sales 0.083 0.074 0.091 0.099 
 [0.275] [0.338] [0.240] [0.207] 
Intangibles/Assets 0.404 0.304 0.386 0.396 
 [0.399] [0.523] [0.422] [0.411] 
Advertising/Sales 1.303 1.272 1.261 1.359 
 [0.158] [0.168] [0.175] [0.140] 
I(High Tech) 0.124 0.144 0.14 0.143 
 [0.530] [0.461] [0.475] [0.463] 
FCF/Assets 0.908** 0.889** 0.931** 0.946** 
 [0.025] [0.030] [0.023] [0.018] 
Trade Imbalance 0.45 -0.602 1.276 0.285 
 [0.758] [0.688] [0.376] [0.847] 
FDI/GDP 104.53 120.259 101.65 121.393 
 [0.351] [0.281] [0.376] [0.298] 
Home Market Cap/GDP -36.605* -32.709 -38.941* -33.117 
 [0.082] [0.106] [0.067] [0.114] 
Home Market Turnover -0.309** -0.339** -0.21 -0.127 
 [0.030] [0.017] [0.150] [0.426] 
ln(Distance from NY km) 0.581 0.753 0.385 0.354 
 [0.780] [0.731] [0.867] [0.864] 
abs(Time Zone Difference) -0.624 -0.682 -0.506 -0.554 
 [0.320] [0.286] [0.454] [0.377] 
I(Same Language) 2.502 2.652 1.666 2.121 
 [0.353] [0.338] [0.547] [0.432] 
Corp Tax Rate 0.533 0.802 0.282 -1.008 
 [0.811] [0.722] [0.901] [0.693] 
Constant 0.552 -1.211 -0.482 4.55 
 [0.972] [0.942] [0.978] [0.768] 
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Observations 3,128 3,128 3,128 3,128 
Pseudo R-squared 13.02% 13.27% 13.08% 12.88% 



















Dependent Variable ln($Volume Ratio+1) 
Model Tobit, Year Dummies, Exchange Dummies, Firm Clustering 
Rules Variable Rules Index Price Manipulation Volume Manipulation Spoofing False Disclosure Market Manipulation Insider Trading Broker  
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Rules Variable 4.747*** 0.744*** -1.737 0.568 1.498*** 2.136*** 0.185 -4.85 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.580] [0.647] [0.000] [0.000] [0.377] [0.123] 
Rules Variable Squared -1.430*** -0.092*** 2.229 -0.098 -0.492*** -0.336*** -0.119* 3.789 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.473] [0.754] [0.000] [0.000] [0.068] [0.226] 
Exchange ln($Volume Ratio+1) 0.109 0.102 0.119 0.12 0.109 0.095 0.128 0.116 
 [0.638] [0.661] [0.610] [0.606] [0.639] [0.687] [0.584] [0.619] 
US Institutional Holdings -3.301*** -3.284*** -3.263*** -3.260*** -3.301*** -3.252*** -3.233*** -3.295*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
ln(Assets) -0.089** -0.090** -0.090** -0.090** -0.089** -0.091** -0.091** -0.089** 
 [0.042] [0.041] [0.041] [0.040] [0.042] [0.038] [0.038] [0.043] 
Debt/Assets 1.109*** 1.117*** 1.137*** 1.141*** 1.125*** 1.158*** 1.148*** 1.128*** 
 [0.006] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] 
Cash/Assets -1.014** -1.024** -1.020** -1.026** -1.014** -1.033** -1.048** -1.011** 
 [0.044] [0.042] [0.044] [0.043] [0.045] [0.041] [0.038] [0.045] 
R&D/Sales 0.095 0.095 0.099 0.099 0.097 0.097 0.099 0.097 
 [0.228] [0.227] [0.213] [0.211] [0.222] [0.207] [0.203] [0.220] 
Intangibles/Assets 0.394 0.389 0.394 0.396 0.396 0.398 0.402 0.387 
 [0.410] [0.418] [0.413] [0.410] [0.409] [0.408] [0.404] [0.420] 
Advertising/Sales 1.369 1.358 1.355 1.355 1.37 1.354 1.35 1.369 
 [0.141] [0.144] [0.142] [0.142] [0.140] [0.140] [0.141] [0.141] 
I(High Tech) 0.142 0.143 0.14 0.141 0.143 0.143 0.142 0.142 
 [0.465] [0.460] [0.472] [0.468] [0.461] [0.462] [0.466] [0.463] 
FCF/Assets 0.920** 0.922** 0.926** 0.930** 0.910** 0.963** 0.958** 0.912** 
 [0.020] [0.020] [0.021] [0.020] [0.023] [0.015] [0.016] [0.022] 
Trade Imbalance 0.197 0.158 0.251 0.27 0.209 0.115 0.265 0.183 
 [0.894] [0.915] [0.865] [0.855] [0.887] [0.938] [0.858] [0.902] 
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FDI/GDP 142.649 120.245 142.288 138.54 149.284 88.206 111.221 135.304 
 [0.212] [0.299] [0.216] [0.227] [0.195] [0.447] [0.332] [0.243] 
Home Market Cap/GDP -34.418 -34.481 -33.098 -33.133 -33.267 -35.198* -34.265 -33.047 
 [0.101] [0.101] [0.115] [0.115] [0.113] [0.094] [0.103] [0.116] 
Home Market Turnover -0.124 -0.112 -0.14 -0.14 -0.135 -0.066 -0.107 -0.13 
 [0.425] [0.475] [0.367] [0.367] [0.382] [0.677] [0.499] [0.403] 
ln(Distance from NY km) 0.828 0.561 0.494 0.253 0.456 0.451 0.541 0.45 
 [0.745] [0.807] [0.820] [0.898] [0.834] [0.835] [0.808] [0.835] 
abs(Time Zone Difference) -0.482 -0.529 -0.558 -0.601 -0.554 -0.536 -0.535 -0.56 
 [0.520] [0.446] [0.390] [0.329] [0.399] [0.416] [0.423] [0.392] 
I(Same Language) 2.341 1.776 1.546 2.242 2.024 5.743* 1.95 -3.376 
 [0.502] [0.571] [0.587] [0.374] [0.483] [0.053] [0.515] [0.380] 
Corp Tax Rate -0.996 -1.062 -1.011 -1.078 -0.993 -1.353 -1.319 -1.006 
 [0.700] [0.682] [0.699] [0.679] [0.702] [0.598] [0.611] [0.698] 
Constant -4.079 1.043 3.005 4.925 2.283 1.44 2.809 3.39 
 [0.834] [0.952] [0.854] [0.742] [0.890] [0.929] [0.868] [0.835] 
Observations 3,128 3,128 3,128 3,128 3,128 3,128 3,128 3,128 
F test 12.96% 12.95% 12.90% 12.89% 12.94% 12.98% 12.89% 12.94% 








This	 table	 contains	 tobit	 regressions	 that	 analyze	 both	 the	 level	 of	 sovereign	 governance	 and	 the	 stock	
exchange	rules.	The	tobit	regression	has	a	lower	bound	of	zero	and	includes	year	and	stock‐exchange	fixed‐




Dependent Variable ln($Volume Ratio +1) 
Model Tobit, Year Dummies, Exchange Dummies, Firm Clustering 
Column [1] [2] [3] [4] 
WB Governance Index 2.567**    
 [0.049]    
WB Governance Index x Rules Index  0.145***   
  [0.001]   
S&P Rating   5.279***  
   [0.009]  
S&P Rating x Rules Index    -0.044 
    [0.825] 
Rules Index 4.534*** 4.200*** 4.233*** 4.728*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Squared Rules Index  -1.332*** -1.186*** -1.222*** -1.425*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Exchange ln($Volume Ratio +1) 0.091 0.084 0.084 0.111 
 [0.695] [0.719] [0.719] [0.633] 
US Institutional Holdings -3.247*** -3.178*** -3.239*** -3.305*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
ln(Assets) -0.101** -0.117*** -0.104** -0.088** 
 [0.021] [0.008] [0.018] [0.047] 
Debt/Assets 1.105*** 1.088*** 1.122*** 1.111*** 
 [0.007] [0.008] [0.006] [0.006] 
Cash/Assets -1.097** -1.284** -1.139** -1.002** 
 [0.028] [0.010] [0.022] [0.045] 
R&D/Sales 0.079 0.069 0.087 0.095 
 [0.304] [0.374] [0.265] [0.228] 
Intangibles/Assets 0.403 0.299 0.384 0.394 
 [0.398] [0.528] [0.422] [0.410] 
Advertising/Sales 1.313 1.28 1.27 1.371 
 [0.159] [0.170] [0.177] [0.141] 
I(High Tech) 0.124 0.144 0.14 0.143 
 [0.531] [0.461] [0.475] [0.462] 
FCF/Assets 0.882** 0.857** 0.904** 0.925** 
 [0.029] [0.036] [0.027] [0.020] 
Trade Imbalance 0.351 -0.738 1.191 0.189 
 [0.810] [0.621] [0.407] [0.898] 
FDI/GDP 125.766 147.71 125.029 139.131 
 [0.261] [0.184] [0.274] [0.232] 
Home Market Cap/GDP -37.444* -33.21 -39.666* -34.115 
 [0.075] [0.100] [0.062] [0.103] 
Home Market Turnover -0.307** -0.345** -0.208 -0.118 
 [0.031] [0.015] [0.151] [0.458] 
ln(Distance from NY km) 0.981 1.103 0.742 0.795 
 [0.692] [0.663] [0.776] [0.751] 
abs(Time Zone Difference) -0.543 -0.616 -0.431 -0.466 
 [0.451] [0.388] [0.554] [0.525] 
I(Same Language) 2.53 2.539 1.608 2.266 
 [0.449] [0.443] [0.622] [0.508] 
Corp Tax Rate 0.83 1.183 0.587 -0.829 
 [0.708] [0.599] [0.795] [0.745] 
Constant -7.333 -8.497 -7.8 -3.732 
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 [0.699] [0.663] [0.696] [0.845] 
Observations 3,128 3,128 3,128 3,128 
Pseudo R-squared 13.11% 13.37% 13.17% 12.96% 







This	 table	 focuses	 on	 the	 interaction	 of	 the	 country‐level	 governance	 variables	 with	 the	 stock	 exchange	












Table	 1	 contains	 the	 variable	 definitions.	 Brackets	 contain	 p‐values.	 	 Superscripts	 ***,	 **,	 and	 *	 denote	
significance	at	1%,	5%,	and	10%,	respectively.		
Dependent Variable ln($Volume Ratio +1) 
Model Tobit, Year Dummies, Exchange Dummies, Firm Clustering 
Column [1] [2] [3] [4] 
WB Governance Index -6.087***    
 [0.000]    
WB Governance Index x Rules Index 5.498***    
 [0.000]    
S&P Rating  -0.173**   
  [0.031]   
S&P Rating x Rules Index  0.211***   
  [0.000]   
ICRG Composite Index   -4.124  
   [0.195]  
ICRG Composite Index x Rules Index   6.679***  
   [0.005]  
ADRI (Spamann)    0.666* 
    [0.055] 
ADRI (Spamann) x Rules Index    -0.509* 
    [0.074] 
Rules Index -4.248*** -3.363*** -4.920** 2.284** 
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.010] [0.038] 
Exchange ln($Volume Ratio +1) 0.079 -0.006 0.042 0.122 
 [0.731] [0.980] [0.855] [0.597] 
US Institutional Holdings -3.209*** -3.135*** -3.228*** -3.243*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
ln(Assets) -0.110** -0.123*** -0.112** -0.090** 
 [0.013] [0.005] [0.011] [0.043] 
Debt/Assets 1.195*** 1.189*** 1.201*** 1.132*** 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.005] 
Cash/Assets -1.204** -1.345*** -1.185** -1.055** 
 [0.017] [0.007] [0.017] [0.034] 
R&D/Sales 0.076 0.069 0.084 0.092 
 [0.319] [0.368] [0.273] [0.249] 
Intangibles/Assets 0.38 0.325 0.35 0.34 
 [0.424] [0.490] [0.463] [0.479] 
Advertising/Sales 1.21 1.205 1.238 1.329 
 [0.207] [0.202] [0.186] [0.157] 
I(High Tech) 0.099 0.111 0.126 0.165 
 [0.615] [0.567] [0.515] [0.399] 
FCF/Assets 0.805* 0.778* 0.866** 0.935** 
 [0.056] [0.067] [0.039] [0.017] 
Trade Imbalance 0.281 -1.006 0.809 0.328 
 [0.842] [0.495] [0.561] [0.824] 
FDI/GDP 132.678 127.315 134.801 153.893 
 [0.242] [0.251] [0.243] [0.183] 
Home Market Cap/GDP -28.03 -28.187 -32.934* -33.523 
 [0.137] [0.125] [0.099] [0.104] 
Home Market Turnover -0.251* -0.347** -0.207 -0.145 
 [0.080] [0.019] [0.157] [0.347] 
ln(Distance from NY km) 0.294 0.556 0.075 0.094 
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 [0.877] [0.790] [0.972] [0.960] 
abs(Time Zone Difference) -0.665 -0.694 -0.523 -0.597 
 [0.266] [0.265] [0.430] [0.320] 
I(Same Language) 2.439 2.138 1.09 2.259 
 [0.307] [0.396] [0.667] [0.358] 
Corp Tax Rate 0.917 2.084 2.003 -0.503 
 [0.664] [0.316] [0.352] [0.835] 
Constant 9.686 5.113 8.555 3.624 
 [0.487] [0.743] [0.590] [0.793] 
Observations 3,128 3,128 3,128 3,128 
Pseudo R-squared 13.44% 13.67% 13.32% 13.02% 
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Dependent Variable ln($Volume Ratio +1) 
MIFID Focus I(2008) =1 if 2008 or later; 0 
otherwise 
I(2005) = 1 if 2005 or later; 0 
otherwise 
I(Before or After not During 2005) = 1 if 2006 or later; 0 if 2004 or 
earlier 
Exchange Dummies NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Column [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
I(MIFID) -0.168 -7.06 -0.235 -8.462 -0.222 -9.518* 
 [0.537] [0.211] [0.409] [0.133] [0.435] [0.099] 
I(2008) -0.330* -0.563***     
 [0.066] [0.003]     
I(2008) * I(MIFID) -0.547** -0.342*     
 [0.015] [0.099]     
I(2005)   -0.313** -0.282*   
   [0.012] [0.050]   
I(MIFID) * I(2005)   -0.02 0.085   
   [0.914] [0.638]   
I(Before or After not During 2005)     -0.293** -0.288* 
     [0.026] [0.063] 
I*(MIFID) * I(Before or After not During 
2005) 
    -0.162 -0.01 
     [0.419] [0.960] 
Exchange ln($Volume Ratio +1) 1.027*** 0.194 1.036*** 0.301 1.055*** 0.351 
 [0.000] [0.395] [0.000] [0.182] [0.000] [0.126] 
US Institutional Holdings -4.535*** -3.342*** -4.447*** -3.328*** -4.398*** -3.349*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
ln(Assets) -0.002 -0.088** -0.002 -0.084* -0.018 -0.098** 
 [0.967] [0.045] [0.960] [0.059] [0.720] [0.031] 
Debt/Assets 1.519*** 1.113*** 1.528*** 1.147*** 1.584*** 1.191*** 
 [0.001] [0.006] [0.001] [0.005] [0.000] [0.004] 
Cash/Assets -1.025* -1.061** -0.986* -1.029** -1.163** -1.212** 
 [0.054] [0.036] [0.060] [0.040] [0.030] [0.018] 
R&D/Sales 0.087 0.108 0.101 0.119 0.122 0.138* 
 [0.281] [0.160] [0.207] [0.118] [0.139] [0.082] 
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Intangibles/Assets 0.475 0.46 0.519 0.485 0.504 0.5 
 [0.357] [0.334] [0.316] [0.310] [0.326] [0.291] 
Advertising/Sales 2.313** 1.363 2.215** 1.332 2.247** 1.421 
 [0.030] [0.148] [0.036] [0.157] [0.028] [0.120] 
I(High Tech) -0.022 0.151 -0.025 0.143 -0.065 0.093 
 [0.915] [0.438] [0.904] [0.466] [0.756] [0.641] 
FCF/Assets 0.991** 1.029** 1.038** 1.090*** 1.134** 1.197*** 
 [0.030] [0.011] [0.026] [0.008] [0.014] [0.004] 
Trade Imbalance -1.062 0.11 -1.167 -0.294 -1.273 -0.27 
 [0.405] [0.941] [0.355] [0.839] [0.310] [0.852] 
FDI/GDP -86.214 13.794 -92.154 9.888 -156.099 -29.528 
 [0.477] [0.903] [0.447] [0.930] [0.237] [0.812] 
Home Market Cap/GDP -23.321 -46.163** -16.724 -30.609* -14.685 -28.772* 
 [0.114] [0.014] [0.228] [0.078] [0.282] [0.086] 
Home Market Turnover -0.069 -0.104 -0.04 -0.094 -0.001 -0.06 
 [0.644] [0.452] [0.801] [0.520] [0.993] [0.684] 
ln(Distance from NY km) -1.559*** 0.229 -1.522*** 0.456 -1.490*** 0.94 
 [0.001] [0.902] [0.001] [0.808] [0.001] [0.636] 
abs(Time Zone Difference) 0.189*** -0.531 0.184*** -0.673 0.188*** -0.791 
 [0.000] [0.374] [0.000] [0.266] [0.000] [0.205] 
I(Same Language) 0.429 -4.734 0.397 -5.408 0.397 -6.104 
 [0.107] [0.174] [0.139] [0.132] [0.136] [0.103] 
Corp Tax Rate -1.823 -1.797 -1.581 -1.053 -1.691 -1.35 
 [0.296] [0.440] [0.355] [0.656] [0.321] [0.570] 
Constant 15.641*** 13.325 15.279*** 13.089 15.104*** 10.819 
 [0.000] [0.269] [0.000] [0.242] [0.000] [0.358] 
Observations 3,128 3,128 3,128 3,128 2,805 2,805 
Pseudo R-squared 7.42% 12.70% 7.40% 12.57% 7.73% 12.69% 








This	table	 focuses	on	the	controlling	 for	the	 ‘information	share’	of	 the	US	market.	Section	4.3	describes	the	












Table	 1	 contains	 the	 variable	 definitions.	 Brackets	 contain	 p‐values.	 	 Superscripts	 ***,	 **,	 and	 *	 denote	
significance	at	1%,	5%,	and	10%,	respectively.		
	
Dependent Variable ln($Volume Ratio +1) 
Model Tobit, Year Dummies, Exchange Dummies, Firm Clustering 
Column [1] [2] [3] [4] 
WB Governance Index 2.256*    
 [0.075]    
S&P Rating  0.131***   
  [0.003]   
ICRG Composite Index   4.775**  
   [0.016]  
ADRI (Spamann)    -0.061 
    [0.762] 
Rules Index 4.462*** 4.157*** 4.194*** 4.625*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Squared Rules Index -1.310*** -1.177*** -1.210*** -1.389*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Information Share 0.020 0.017 0.019 0.020 
 [0.179] [0.245] [0.202] [0.176] 
Exchange ln($Volume Ratio +1) 0.072 0.063 0.064 0.088 
 [0.752] [0.784] [0.781] [0.701] 
US Institutional Holdings -3.195*** -3.135*** -3.186*** -3.245*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
ln(Assets) -0.107** -0.120*** -0.109** -0.095** 
 [0.015] [0.007] [0.013] [0.032] 
Debt/Assets 1.145*** 1.127*** 1.157*** 1.156*** 
 [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] 
Cash/Assets -1.118** -1.283*** -1.153** -1.032** 
 [0.024] [0.010] [0.020] [0.037] 
R&D/Sales 0.075 0.066 0.081 0.088 
 [0.334] [0.401] [0.299] [0.264] 
Intangibles/Assets 0.382 0.289 0.366 0.371 
 [0.420] [0.539] [0.441] [0.436] 
Advertising/Sales 1.186 1.164 1.147 1.235 
 [0.198] [0.208] [0.216] [0.179] 
I(High Tech) 0.147 0.165 0.161 0.164 
 [0.441] [0.381] [0.393] [0.381] 
FCF/Assets 0.841** 0.818** 0.860** 0.878** 
 [0.033] [0.040] [0.031] [0.024] 
Trade Imbalance 0.654 -0.368 1.426 0.539 
 [0.653] [0.806] [0.318] [0.714] 
FDI/GDP 118.637 137.968 117.558 126.956 
 [0.277] [0.205] [0.291] [0.264] 
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Home Market Cap/GDP -30.834 -27.325 -33.01 -27.424 
 [0.135] [0.169] [0.112] [0.179] 
Home Market Turnover -0.354** -0.386*** -0.268* -0.189 
 [0.013] [0.006] [0.056] [0.208] 
ln(Distance from NY km) 1.222 1.284 0.991 1.048 
 [0.629] [0.618] [0.708] [0.681] 
abs(Time Zone Difference) -0.623 -0.676 -0.519 -0.548 
 [0.388] [0.345] [0.477] [0.455] 
I(Same Language) 2.786 2.759 1.944 2.511 
 [0.405] [0.405] [0.553] [0.462] 
Corp Tax Rate 1.754 2.061 1.557 0.43 
 [0.418] [0.351] [0.482] [0.862] 
Constant -8.945 -9.707 -9.321 -5.669 
 [0.646] [0.624] [0.646] [0.771] 
Observations 3,081 3,081 3,081 3,081 
Pseudo R-squared 13.20% 13.42% 13.26% 13.09% 
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